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BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. The Field of the Invention

The present invention relates to the field of computer networks. In particular, the present invention relates to methods and systems for synchronizing security descriptors in computer networks that use multiple security descriptor specifications.

2. The Prior State of the Art

In the context of computers, security is often defined as the prevention of unauthorized use of an object. Such objects may include documents, databases, user objects, mailboxes, executables and the like.

In order to prevent unauthorized use of an object, prior to allowing a requested use of the object, computer systems typically authenticate the requesting entity to obtain a reasonable degree of security that the requesting entity is what it purports to be. Once the requesting entity is authenticated, the computer system refers to security information called "security descriptors" (also called "access control lists") that describe the requesting entity's rights to use the object. If the security descriptor expressly or implicitly indicates that the requested use is unauthorized for the requesting entity, then the computer system typically does not allow the requested use of the object to the requesting entity. Otherwise, if the security descriptor expressly or implicitly indicates that the requested use is authorized for the requesting entity, then the computer system typically allows the requested use of the object to the requesting entity. Thus, current security mechanisms rely heavily on security descriptors that define user rights to objects.

Different programs may define the same rights differently using different security descriptors. So long as the program controlling use of an object is able to interpret a

1 security descriptor properly, the program should also be able to properly control the use of
2 the object. Some programs may recognize one specification for interpreting security
3 descriptors while another recognizes an entirely different security descriptor specification.
4 For example, the MICROSOFT ® WINDOWS NT ® workstation 4.0 and server 4.0
5 operating systems recognize a security descriptor specification called herein the “4.0
6 specification.” In contrast, the MICROSOFT ® WINDOWS ® 2000 operating system
7 recognizes a significantly different security descriptor specification that is used by the
8 ACTIVE DIRECTORY™ and is called herein the “Active Directory specification.” The
9 relevant points of each of these security descriptor specifications will now be described.

10 Typically, security descriptors include one or more ACEs or “Access Control
11 Entries”, each ACE including a security principle identifier (e.g., a user, group, or
12 computer) followed by list of rights that apply to that security principle identifier. In the
13 4.0 specification, the ACEs include a field of 32 bits often called an “access mask”, each
14 bit in the access mask representing a flag that defines a certain right. If the flag is set high,
15 that means that the right is allowed for the associated security principle. This type of ACE
16 is often called a “standard” ACE since the ACE is not in the form of an object. In order to
17 avoid confusion with other elements in this application labeled “standard”, these
18 “standard” ACEs will be referred to as “non-object” ACEs in this description and in the
19 claims.

20 The Active Directory specification may also include security descriptors that have
21 “non-object” ACEs which include a similar access mask associated with a security
22 principal identifier. However, in the Active Directory specification, security descriptors
23 may also be in the form of an object that defines rights using a GUID or “Globally Unique
24 Identifier”, each GUID representing an individual right. Since the number of GUIDs that

1 may be used to identify rights is essentially limitless, numerous individual rights may be
2 associated with a security principle identifier. Thus, the Active Directory specification
3 permits for fine-grained control over security permissions. The GUID ACEs are often
4 referred to as "Object ACEs" since they are in the form of an object.

5 Often, different security descriptors exist in a common network. This type of
6 network will be referred to as a "security heterogenic network". For example, one device
7 in the network may run the MICROSOFT ® WINDOWS ® 2000 operating system thus
8 representing security rights to objects using the Active Directory specification. On the
9 other hand, another device in the network may run either the MICROSOFT ® WINDOWS
10 NT ® workstation 4.0 and server 4.0 operating systems thus representing security rights to
11 objects using the 4.0 specification. In networked computer systems, it is common for
12 many devices to represent the security rights associated with an object even if the device
13 does not locally contain the object. Thus, in security heterogenic networks, security rights
14 to the same object may be represented by different security descriptors that follow different
15 security descriptor specifications.

16 It is important to any security system that rights granted to a given object be
17 accurately and consistently represented across each device in the network at any given
18 point in time. Otherwise, security permissions may differ depending on the device
19 accessing the object on behalf of the requester. However, such accurate and consistent
20 representation across security heterogenic networks is difficult due to the heterogenic
21 nature of the network using different security descriptor specifications. Accordingly,
22 methods and systems are desired for accurately and consistently representing or
23 "synchronizing" security descriptors even in security heterogenic networks such as those
24 that use both the 4.0 specification and the Active Directory specification.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present invention includes methods and systems for replicating, in a non-degenerative fashion, security descriptors in a security heterogenic network which uses different security descriptor specifications to describes security permissions to the same object. An example of a security heterogenic network includes a network that uses both the 4.0 security descriptor specification described above and the Active Directory security descriptor specification also described above to describe security rights to the same object.

The method may be implemented in whole or in part by a converter module that acts as a link between security descriptors that follow one security descriptor specification in describing security rights to a given object and security descriptors that follow another security descriptor specification in describing that given object.

Initially, the first security descriptor that follows the first security descriptor specification is converted into a version of the first security descriptor that follows the second security descriptor specification. In order to accomplish this, the converter module has access to mapping rules that define mappings of sets of one or more rights of the first security descriptor specification with corresponding sets of one or more rights of the second security descriptor specification. The mappings preferably links rights that have equivalent security meanings so that security descriptors that described security rights to the same object to not represent inconsistent rights to that object.

For each right (or set of rights) for which there is a corresponding mapping rule, the converter converting the right that follows the first security descriptor specification to a corresponding right (or set of rights) that follows the second security descriptor specification. The converter then assembles all of the converted rights to form the version of the first security descriptor that follows the second security descriptor specification.

1 Thus, at the immediate conclusion of this conversion, there are two versions of the first
2 security descriptor, one that follows the first security descriptor specification and one that
3 follows the second security descriptor specification.

4 The converter then compares the version of the first security descriptor that follows
5 the second security descriptor specification with the second security descriptor that also
6 follows the second security descriptor specification. The comparison is simplified since
7 both compared security descriptors follow the same second security descriptor
8 specification. For each right or set of rights for which there is a corresponding mapping
9 rule, the converter compares the right in the version of the first security descriptor that
10 follows the second security descriptor specification to the right in the second security
11 descriptor. Based on this comparison, the converter detects changes in the first security
12 descriptor that are not reflected in the second security descriptor. Subsequently, these
13 changes are made to the second security descriptor so that the first and second security
14 descriptors are again brought back into synchronization at least so far as the mapping rules
15 are concerned.

16 This method may be repeated periodically or after one or more changes so that at
17 any given moment, it is highly likely that the security descriptors that follow the first
18 security descriptor specification are consistent with the security descriptors that follow the
19 second security descriptor specification even though any of the security descriptors may
20 change over time.

21 An advantage of this method is that access to any given object is governed by
22 consistent security rights no matter what the security descriptor specification of the
23 security descriptor consulted to determine those rights. Thus, security remains consistently
24 applied even in security heterogenic networks.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

In order that the manner in which the above-recited and other advantages and features of the invention are obtained, a more particular description of the invention briefly described above will be rendered by reference to specific embodiments thereof which are illustrated in the appended drawings. Understanding that these drawings depict only typical embodiments of the invention and are not therefore to be considered to be limiting of its scope, the invention will be described and explained with additional specificity and detail through the use of the accompanying drawings in which:

Figure 1 illustrates an exemplary system that provides a suitable operating environment for the present invention;

Figure 2 schematically illustrates an example security heterogenic computer network environment in which the present invention may operate;

Figure 3 is a flowchart of a method of granting or blocking a requested use of an object depending on the requesting entity's rights to use the object;

Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of two security descriptors that follow different security descriptor specifications, but that are linked together using a converter and mapping rules;

Figure 5 illustrates a data structure that represents example mapping rules;

Figure 6A illustrates a first security descriptor (security descriptor #1) that follows a first security descriptor specification (specification #2);

Figure 6B illustrates the security descriptor #1 of Figure 6A and a second security descriptor (security descriptor #2) that follows a second security descriptor specification (specification #2), the security descriptors being consistent so far as the mapping rules of Figure 5 are concerned;

1 Figure 7 is a flowchart of a method of replicating changes between security
2 descriptors even though those security descriptors follow different security descriptor
3 specifications;

4 Figure 8A illustrates the data structures of Figure 6B in which changes have been
5 made to the security descriptor #1;

6 Figure 8B illustrates the data structures of Figure 8A in which the security
7 descriptor #1 is used to create a converted version of the security descriptor that follows
8 the specification #2 and which is compared with the security descriptor #2 to detect the
9 changes to the security descriptor #1;

10 Figure 8C illustrates the data structures of Figure 8A in which the changes to the
11 security descriptor #1 are replicated to the security descriptor #2;

12 Figure 9A illustrates the data structures of Figure 8C in which the changes made to
13 the security descriptor #2 are undone;

14 Figure 9B illustrates the data structures of Figure 9A in which the security
15 descriptor #2 is used to create a converted version of the security descriptor that follows
16 the specification #1 and which is compared with the security descriptor #1 to detect the
17 changes to the security descriptor #2;

18 Figure 9C illustrates the data structures of Figure 9A in which the undoing of the
19 changes to the security descriptor #2 are replicated to the security descriptor #1 thus
20 returning both security descriptors to the exact state in which they existed before any
21 changes were made;

22 Figure 10 more specifically illustrates a method of replicating changes to a 4.0
23 security descriptor to an Active Directory security descriptor; and
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Figure 11 more specifically illustrates a method of replicating changes to an Active
Directory security descriptor to a 4.0 security descriptor.

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1 Figure 1 and the following discussion are intended to provide a brief, general
2 description of a suitable computing environment in which the invention may be
3 implemented. Although not required, the invention will be described in the general context
4 of computer-executable instructions, such as program modules, being executed by
5 computers in network environments. Generally, program modules include routines,
6 programs, objects, components, data structures, etc. that perform particular tasks or
7 implement particular abstract data types. Computer-executable instructions, associated
8 data structures, and program modules represent examples of the program code means for
9 executing steps of the methods disclosed herein. The particular sequence of such
10 executable instructions or associated data structures represent examples of corresponding
11 acts for implementing the functions described in such steps.

12 Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the invention may be practiced in
13 network computing environments with many types of computer system configurations,
14 including personal computers, hand-held devices, multi-processor systems,
15 microprocessor-based or programmable consumer electronics, network PCs,
16 minicomputers, mainframe computers, and the like. The invention may also be practiced
17 in distributed computing environments where tasks are performed by local and remote
18 processing devices that are linked (either by hardwired links, wireless links, or by a
19 combination of hardwired or wireless links) through a communications network. In a
20 distributed computing environment, program modules may be located in both local and
21 remote memory storage devices.

22 With reference to Figure 1, an exemplary system for implementing the invention
23 includes a general purpose computing device in the form of a conventional computer 120,
24 including a processing unit 121, a system memory 122, and a system bus 123 that couples

1 various system components including the system memory 122 to the processing unit 121.
2 The system bus 123 may be any of several types of bus structures including a memory bus
3 or memory controller, a peripheral bus, and a local bus using any of a variety of bus
4 architectures. The system memory includes read only memory (ROM) 124 and random
5 access memory (RAM) 125. A basic input/output system (BIOS) 126, containing the basic
6 routines that help transfer information between elements within the computer 120, such as
7 during start-up, may be stored in ROM 124.

8 The computer 120 may also include a magnetic hard disk drive 127 for reading
9 from and writing to a magnetic hard disk 139, a magnetic disk drive 128 for reading from
10 or writing to a removable magnetic disk 129, and an optical disk drive 130 for reading
11 from or writing to removable optical disk 131 such as a CD-ROM or other optical media.
12 The magnetic hard disk drive 127, magnetic disk drive 128, and optical disk drive 130 are
13 connected to the system bus 123 by a hard disk drive interface 132, a magnetic disk drive-
14 interface 133, and an optical drive interface 134, respectively. The drives and their
15 associated computer-readable media provide nonvolatile storage of computer-executable
16 instructions, data structures, program modules and other data for the computer 120.
17 Although the exemplary environment described herein employs a magnetic hard disk 139,
18 a removable magnetic disk 129 and a removable optical disk 131, other types of computer
19 readable media for storing data can be used, including magnetic cassettes, flash memory
20 cards, digital video disks, Bernoulli cartridges, RAMs, ROMs, and the like.

21 *Sub a1* Program code means comprising one or more program modules may be stored on
22 the hard disk 139, magnetic disk 129, optical disk 131, ROM 124 or RAM 125, including
23 an operating system 135, one or more application programs 136, other program modules
24 137, and program data 138. A user may enter commands and information into the

computer 120 through keyboard 140, pointing device 142, or other input devices (not shown), such as a microphone, joy stick, game pad, satellite dish, scanner, or the like. These and other input devices are often connected to the processing unit 121 through a serial port interface 146 coupled to system bus 123. Alternatively, the input devices may be connected by other interfaces, such as a parallel port, a game port or a universal serial bus (USB). A monitor 147 or another display device is also connected to system bus 123 via an interface, such as video adapter 148. In addition to the monitor, personal computers typically include other peripheral output devices (not shown), such as speakers and printers.

The computer 120 may operate in a networked environment using logical connections to one or more remote computers, such as remote computers 149a and 149b. Remote computers 149a and 149b may each be another personal computer, a server, a router, a network PC, a peer device or other common network node, and typically include many or all of the elements described above relative to the computer 120, although only memory storage devices 150a and 150b and their associated application programs 136a and 136b have been illustrated in Figure 1. The logical connections depicted in Figure 1 include a local area network (LAN) 151 and a wide area network (WAN) 152 that are presented here by way of example and not limitation. Such networking environments are commonplace in office-wide or enterprise-wide computer networks, intranets and the Internet.

When used in a LAN networking environment, the computer 120 is connected to the local network 151 through a network interface or adapter 153. When used in a WAN networking environment, the computer 120 may include a modem 154, a wireless link, or other means for establishing communications over the wide area network 152, such as the

1 Internet. The modem 154, which may be internal or external, is connected to the system
2 bus 123 via the serial port interface 146. In a networked environment, program modules
3 depicted relative to the computer 120, or portions thereof, may be stored in the remote
4 memory storage device. It will be appreciated that the network connections shown are
5 exemplary and other means of establishing communications over wide area network 152
6 may be used.

7 Figure 2 illustrates a suitable example network environment including a server
8 network 202 in which the present invention may be implemented. The server network 202
9 includes a two or more servers including servers 206a and 206b that can each
10 independently control the use of an object such as object 210. For example, any of
11 computers systems 204a through 204e or users thereof may request a certain use of the
12 object 210. In response, either the server 206a or the server 206b will respond to the
13 request by facilitating or blocking the use of the object 210 as appropriate.

14 For example, the server network 202 may be a server cluster that is designed to
15 perform work as a single unit as though the server cluster was a single powerful server.
16 Typically, the server cluster performs appropriate load balancing such that if one server is
17 out of operation or overloaded, then task are assigned to other servers within the server
18 cluster. Thus, the selection of which server 206 responds to the request and thus controls
19 use of the object 210 may be entirely out of the control of the requesting entity. In other
20 instances, the requesting entity may be able to select which server 206 responds to the
21 request. In either case, it is desirable that the use of the object is controlled as uniformly as
22 possible regardless of the server that actually responds to the request.

23 As mentioned above, the server network 202 is connectable to one or more
24 computer systems 204, each requesting computer system 204a through 204e being capable

1 of making a request for objects such as documents and executable files maintained by the
2 server network 202. As an example, these requesting computer systems 204 may include
3 other server computer systems such as server 204a, or client computer systems such as
4 desk top personal computer 204b, lap top computer 204c, personal digital assistant 204d
5 and/or mobile telephone 204e. The servers 206 and the requesting computers 204 may be
6 structure with varying degrees of similarity to the structure of computer 120 described
7 above and may potentially include some or all of the elements described above for
8 computer 120.

9 *Sub a2* The memory device such as memory device 208 that stores the object may be any
10 memory device that the servers 206 have access to. By way of example, the memory
11 device 208 may include any of the memory device described above for Figure 1 including
12 ROM 124, RAM 125, removable magnetic disk 129, removable optical disk 131, hard
13 magnetic disk 139 or any other memory device. In some cases, the memory device 208
14 may represent multiple memory devices as when the object 210 is replicated or cached on
15 several memory devices in order to allow the server network more efficient access to the
16 object. The object 210 may essentially be any data structure including document files,
17 executable files and so forth.

18 Server networks often have security mechanisms that prevent unauthorized use of
19 an object. Such security mechanisms often include requiring the requesting entity (such as
20 a computer system or user thereof) to authenticate their identity to the server network.
21 Thus, server networks clusters may determine that the requesting entity is indeed what the
22 requesting entity purports to be. Otherwise, the requesting entity could falsely claim to be
23 an entity that has sensitive access privileges.

1 Once authenticated, the server network may impose certain restrictions on the use
2 of the object depending on the permissions granted or denied to that particular requesting
3 entity. In Figure 2, if the request is handled by the server 206a, then the server 206a
4 consults a data compilation 214a stored on a memory device 212a to determine the security
5 permissions of the requesting entity relevant to the object 210. If the request is handled by
6 the server 206b, then the server 206b consults a data compilation 214b stored on memory
7 device 212b to determine the security permissions of the requesting entity relevant to the
8 object 210. The data compilation may be a directory or any other compilation capable of
9 storing security information regarding objects. Although the memory devices 212a, 212b
10 and 210 are shown as being separate memory devices in Figure 2, one or more or all of
11 these memory devices may actually be the same physical device.

12 Each data compilation 214 includes object entries describing properties related to
13 different objects including the object 210. For example, the data compilation 214a
14 includes an object entry 216a that corresponds to the object 210. The object entry 216a
15 includes a number of properties 218a related to the object including security descriptors
16 220a that follow a first security descriptor specification (i.e., "SPECIFICATION #1"). For
17 example, the first security descriptor specification may be the 4.0 security descriptor
18 specification described above. The server 206a consults the security descriptors 220a to
19 determine security permissions of the requesting entity relevant to the object 210.

20 The other data compilation 214b includes an object entry 216b that also
21 corresponds to the same object 210. The object entry 216b also includes a number of
22 properties 218a related to the object including security descriptors 220b. However, the
23 security descriptors 220b differ from the security descriptors 220a in that the security
24 descriptors 220b follow a second security descriptor specification (i.e., "SPECIFICATION

1 #2"). For example, the second security descriptor specification may be the Active
2 Directory specification described above. The server 206b consults the security descriptors
3 220b to determine security permissions of the requesting entity relevant to the object 210.

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as > The server network 202 is thus a security heterogenic computer network. In this
5 description and in the claims, a network in which different security descriptor
6 specifications are used when determining security permissions is referred to as a "security
7 heterogenic computer network." A security heterogenic computer network may occur
8 when different software is running on the servers within the network. For example, some
9 of the server such as server 206a may be running MICROSOFT ® WINDOWS NT ®
10 workstation 4.0 or server 4.0 operating systems or perhaps MICROSOFT ® Exchange
11 version 5.5. Each of these software packages uses the 4.0 security descriptor specification.
12 On the other hand, other servers such as server 206b may be running MICROSOFT ®
13 WINDOWS ® 2000 operating system or MICROSOFT ® Exchange 2000 which use the
14 Active Directory security descriptor specification.

15 Figure 3 is a flowchart of a method 300 for a server such as server 206a or 206b to
16 respond to a request to use an object such as object 210 from a requesting entity such as
17 computer systems 204. First, the server receives the use request from the requesting entity
18 (step 310). The server then accesses the corresponding object entry (step 320). Next, the
19 corresponding security descriptors are evaluated (step 330). If the security descriptor
20 indicates that the requested use is permitted (YES in decision block 340), then the
21 requested use is facilitated (step 350). Otherwise (NO in decision block 340), the requested
22 use is blocked (step 360).

1 It is important that the determination of whether the requested use is permitted
2 (decision block 340) be as consistent as possible regardless of the particular server in the
3 server network that performs the method 300. The present invention facilitates this by
4 allowing for an accurate linking between all security descriptors that describe a given
5 object so that each security descriptor is as consistent as possible. The linking allows for
6 security descriptors to be properly replicated into different security descriptor
7 specifications. In addition, changes to any of the security descriptors that correspond to a
8 given object are propagated to the other security descriptors that correspond to that given
9 object.

10 Figure 4 schematically illustrates a structure 400 that may accomplish this
11 replication. The structure includes a replicator 410 that links a security descriptor 420 that
12 follows a first security descriptor specification with a security descriptor 430 that follows a
13 second security descriptor specification. The security descriptor may be replicated
14 between the first and second security descriptor specifications using a mapping rules data
15 structure 440. The mapping rules 440 define what set of one or more rights of the first
16 security descriptor specification bi-directionally map to and from what set of one or more
17 rights of the second security descriptor specification. These mapping rules are preferably
18 changeable so that they can be tailored to match the given needs or different organizations.

19 Figure 5 illustrates an example 500 of mapping rules 440 in which rights of the first
20 security descriptor specification labeled A, B, C, D, E.1, E.2 and !D under "SPEC #1" are
21 mapped to and from corresponding rights of the second security descriptor specifications
22 labeled A', B', C.1', C.2', D', E' and !D'. More specifically, the mapping rules 500
23 indicate that if right A is present in SPEC #1, then right A' should be present in SPEC #2,
24 and vice versa. If right B is present in SPEC #1, then right B' should be present in SPEC

1 #2, and vice versa. If right C is present in SPEC #1, then right C.1' and C.2' should both
2 be present in SPEC #2, and vice versa. If right D is present in SPEC #1, then right D'
3 should be present in SPEC #2, and vice versa. If rights E.1 and E.2 are both present in
4 SPEC #1, then right E' should be present in SPEC #2, and vice versa. Finally, if right !D
5 is present in SPEC #1, then right !D' should be present in SPEC #2.

6 Figure 6A and 6B illustrate how the mapping rules 500 may be used to initially
7 replicate a security descriptor. Figure 6A illustrates a security descriptor that follows
8 security descriptor specification #1. This security descriptor has rights A, C, D, E.1, E.2
9 and F. Note that right F is not in the mapping rules and is thus ignored when the mapping
10 rules are applied. Using the mapping rules 500, right A maps to right A', right C maps to
11 the combination of rights C.1' and C.2', right D maps to right D', rights E.1 and E.2
12 combine to map to right E', and right F does not map at all. Figure 6B illustrates the
13 original security descriptor that follows specification #1. In addition, the right hand side of
14 Figure 6B illustrates security descriptor #2 that follows the security descriptor specification
15 #2 and that includes the rights that resulted from the mapping operation including rights
16 A', C.1', C.2', D' and E'. Thus, the security descriptors in Figure 6B are consistent as far
17 as the mapping rules 500 are concerned.

18 *SW* *a3* Now that the security descriptors are consistent, any changes to one of the security
19 descriptors are replicated to the other security descriptor. Figure 7 illustrates a method 700
20 for replicating changes in security descriptor #1 to security descriptor #2. The data
21 structures involved with this replication are shown as they existed at instances of time
22 sequentially beginning at Figure 8A and ending at Figure 8C. The method of Figure 7 will
23 now be described with reference to the data structures of Figures 8A, 8B and 8C.
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1 In Figure 8A, security descriptor #1 has changed since the time in Figure 6B when
2 both security descriptors were consistent. Specifically, the right C has been deleted and
3 the right D has been changed to the right !D. These changes are each underscored by an
4 asterisks to identify where the change took place. The method of Figure 700 will be
5 implement to replicate this change to the security descriptor #2 so that the security
6 descriptor #2 may once again be consistent with the security descriptor #1 at least so far as
7 the mapping rules 500 are concerned. The method of Figure 700 may be executed
8 periodically or may be executed in response to any change to one security descriptor or the
9 other.

10 First, embodiments within the scope of the present invention include a step for
11 converting security descriptor #1 that follows specification #1 into a version of the security
12 descriptor #1 that follows specification #2 (step 710). This conversion is shown in Figure
13 8B. Using the mapping rules (act 720), sets of one or more rights in the security descriptor
14 #1 that follows the specification #1 are converted into corresponding sets of one or more
15 rights that follow the specification #2 (act 730). Next, the converted rights are assembled
16 (act 740) to form the version of the security descriptor #1 that follows the specification #2.

17 Referring to the example of Figure 8B, the right A is mapped to the right A', the
18 right !D is mapped to the right !D', the combination of rights E.1 and E.2 is mapped to the
19 right E' and the right F is not mapped at all. Thus, the version of the security descriptor #1
20 that follows the specification #2 is consistent with the security descriptor #1 that follows
21 the specification #1 at least so far as the mapping rules are concerned.

22 Referring back to Figure 7, embodiments within the scope of the present invention
23 include a step for comparing the version of the security descriptor #1 that follows the
24 specification #2 with the security descriptor #2 that follows the specification #2 (step 750).

1 More specifically, each converted right of the version of the security descriptor #1 is
2 compared with rights (or lack thereof) in the security descriptor #2 (act 760). Based on
3 this comparison, changes that have been made in the security descriptor #1, but not in the
4 security descriptor #2, are detected (act 770).

5 In the example of Figure 8B, the rights A' and E' are present in both the version of
6 the security descriptor #1 that follows the specification #2 and the security descriptor #2.
7 However, the comparison shows that the rights C.1' and C.2' have been deleted from the
8 security descriptor #1, and that the right D' has been changed to the right !D'.

9 Referring back to Figure 7, the detected changes are then made to the security
10 descriptor #2 (act 780). This state is represented by Figure 8C which shows that the
11 changes are made to the security descriptor #2 as underscored by the asterisks. This brings
12 the security descriptors back into consistency as far as the mapping rules are concerned.

13 Now assume that the changes made to security descriptor #1 in Figure 8A are now
14 undone in the security descriptor #2 in Figure 9A. Specifically, right C.1' and C.2' which
15 were previously deleted from security descriptor #2 are now added back. Also, right !D' is
16 changed back to right D' as underscored by the asterisks in the security descriptor #2
17 shown in Figure 9A.

18 Sub 94 The method of Figure 7 is then implemented except that changes to the security
19 descriptor #2 are now made to replicated to the security descriptor #1. Specifically, in step
20 710, the security descriptor #2 that follows the specification #2 is converted into a version
21 of the security descriptor #2 that follows the specification #1 as shown in Figure 9B.
22 Using the mapping rules, right A' maps to right A, the combination of rights C.1' and C.2'
23 map to right C, right D' maps to right D, and right E' maps to the combination of rights
24 E.1 and E.2 to form the version of the security descriptor #2 that follows the specification

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1 #1. Next, this version is compared to the security descriptor #1 that also follows the
2 specification #1 to reveal that right C is added and right !D is changed to right D. These
3 changes are then implemented in the security descriptor #1 as shown in Figure 9C.

4 Note that the security descriptors shown in Figure 9C are identical to the original
5 security descriptors shown in Figure 6B. Thus, the replication occurs in a non-
6 degenerative fashion. In other words, no information was lost by making the changes and
7 then undoing the changes. The scenario in which a security descriptor is changed and then
8 undone may occur, for example, when a network administrator makes a change to a user's
9 security rights to an object but then realizes that the change is a mistake. The network
10 administrator may then undo the change. However, unbeknownst to the network
11 administrator, the change may have been implemented by the server 206a using the
12 specification #1 while the undoing of the change may have been implemented by the server
13 206b using the specification #2. In this case, the network administrator surely intends for
14 the undoing of the change to actually undo the change as though the change never occurred
15 in the first place. The network administrator would not intend for security information to
16 be lost by implement a change followed by an undo operation. Thus, the non-degenerative
17 reversible nature of the method of Figure 7 might likely be in line with consumer
18 expectations.

19 The above describes a method of replicating in a non-degenerative fashion between
20 one security descriptor specification generically labeled "specification #1" and another
21 security descriptor specification generically labeled "specification #2". The following
22 discussion provides an example of how the method of Figure 7 may be implemented to
23 replicate between the 4.0 security descriptor specification and the Active Directory security
24 descriptor specification.

1 The terms "4.0 security descriptor specification" or "4.0 specification" are terms
2 interchangeably used in this description and in the claims to refer to the security descriptor
3 specification implemented by the MICROSOFT ® WINDOWS NT ® workstation 4.0 and
4 server 4.0 operating systems. The terms "Active Directory security descriptor
5 specification" and "Active Directory specification" are terms interchangeably used in this
6 description and in the claims to refer to the security descriptor specification implemented
7 by the MICROSOFT ® WINDOWS ® 2000 operating system.

8 The following Table 1 illustrates side-by-side example security descriptors that
9 each describe security permissions related to an entity "John Doe". A 4.0 security
10 descriptor describing security rights related to "John Doe" is provided under the heading
11 "4.0 SD" in the left half of the page. An Active Directory security descriptor describing
12 security rights related to "John Doe" is provided under the heading "AD SD" in the right
13 half of the page.

<u>4.0 SD</u>	<u>AD SD</u>
John Doe:	STANDARD
Send As	John Doe:
Receive As	Change Password
Modify User Attributes	Modify Personal Info
Boss:	Admin:
Receive As	Modify Personal Info
Network Guru:	Support:
Modify Admin Attributes	Reset Password
Admin:	MAILBOX

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Modify User Attributes

John Doe:

Send-As

Receive-As

Boss:

Receive-As

TABLE 1 – EXAMPLE SECURITY DESCRIPTORS

This 4.0 security descriptor indicates that the entity having the alias “John Doe” has the right to send electronic messages as John Doe, receive messages as John Doe, and modify user attributes associated with John Doe. Also, an entity “Boss” has the right to receive electronic messages as John Doe. Thus, messages destined for John Doe will be received by John Doe and Boss. “Network Guru” has the right to modify administration attributes associated with John Doe while “Admin” has the right to modify user attributes associated with John Doe.

The Active Directory security descriptor is divided into two categories of rights; “MAILBOX” rights that related to network communication, and “STANDARD” rights that related to other rights. The Active Directory security descriptor indicates that John Doe has the right to change his own password and modify his own personal information. Admin has the right to modify John Doe’s personal information. “Support” has the right to reset John Doe’s password. John Doe has the right to send electronic message as himself and receive electronic messages as himself. Boss has the right to receive electronic messages as John Doe.

1 In order to replicate, a set of mapping rules is provided. The following TABLE 2 is
2 an example set of mapping rules that will be applied to the above example 4.0 security
3 descriptor and Active Directory security descriptor. Rights for the 4.0 specification are
4 listed under the heading "4.0 SPEC" while rights for the Active Directory specification are
5 listed under the heading "AD SPEC".
6

<u>4.0 SPEC</u>		<u>AD SPEC</u>
Send As	<---->	Send-As
Receive As	<---->	Receive-As
Modify User Attributes	<---->	Modify Personal Info

12 TABLE 2 – MAPPING RULES

14 These mapping rules indicates that if the "Send As" right appears in the 4.0
15 specification, then the "Send-As" right should appear in the Active Directory specification,
16 and vice versa. If the "Receive As" right appears in the 4.0 specification, then the
17 "Receive-As" right should appear in the Active Directory specification, and vice versa. If
18 the "Modify User Attributes" right appears in the 4.0 specification, then the "Modify
19 Personal Info" right should appear in the Active Directory specification, and vice versa.

20 The example security descriptors of Table 1 are consistent so far as the mapping
21 rules of Table 2 are concerned. For example, the 4.0 security descriptor indicates that John
22 Doe has the right to "Send As" while the Active Directory security descriptor indicates that
23 John Doe has the right to "Send-As" which is consistent with the first mapping rule. The
24 4.0 security descriptor indicates that John Doe has the right to "Receive As" while the

1 Active Directory security descriptor indicates that John Doe has the right to "Receive-As"
2 which is consistent with the second mapping rule. The 4.0 security descriptor indicates
3 that Boss has the right to "Receive As" while the Active Directory security descriptor
4 indicates that Boss has the right to "Receive As" which is also consistent with the second
5 mapping rule. The 4.0 security descriptor indicates that John Doe and Admin have the
6 right to "Modify User Attributes" while the Active Directory security descriptor indicates
7 that John Doe and Admin have the right to "Modify Personal Info" which is consistent
8 with the last mapping rule.

9 Note that there are certain rights that are not mapped to any other rights. For
10 example, the 4.0 specification right "Modify Admin Attributes" is not mapped to any
11 corresponding right(s) in the Active Directory specification. Furthermore, the Active
12 Directory rights "Change Password" and "Reset Password" are not mapped to any
13 corresponding right(s) in the 4.0 specification. Therefore, in determining whether or not
14 the two security descriptors are consistent, these rights are ignored.

15 Thus, we begin with a state in TABLE 1 in which the security descriptors are
16 consistent as far as the mapping rules of TABLE 2 are concerned. Suppose now that the
17 right of "Boss" to "Receive As" John Doe is removed from the 4.0 security descriptor.
18 Before this change is replicated to the Active Directory security descriptor, the 4.0 security
19 descriptors of Table 1 would appear as follows in Table 3.

21 4.0 SD

22 John Doe:

23 Send As

24 Receive As

1 Modify User Attributes

2 Network Guru:

3 Modify Admin Attributes

4 Admin:

5 Modify User Attributes

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7 TABLE 3 – NEW 4.0 SECURITY DESCRIPTOR

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9 In following the method 700 of Figure 1, the 4.0 security descriptor that follows the
 10 4.0 specification is converted into a version of the 4.0 security descriptor that follows the
 11 Active Directory specification (step 710). In so doing, the mapping rules of TABLE 2 are
 12 consulted (act 720) and each right(s) in the 4.0 security descriptor that follows the 4.0
 13 specification is converted into a corresponding right(s) in the Active Directory
 14 specification (act 730). These rights are then assembled to form the version of the 4.0
 15 specification that follows the Active Directory specification. The following Table 4
 16 illustrates the original 4.0 security descriptor under the heading “ORIGINAL 4.0 SD” with
 17 the revised 4.0 security descriptor that follows the Active Directory specification under the
 18 heading “REVISED 4.0 SD”.

19

20 ORIGINAL 4.0 SD

REVISED 4.0 SD

21 John Doe:

STANDARD

22 Send As

John Doe:

23 Receive As

Modify Personal Info

24 Modify User Attributes

Admin:

CONFIDENTIAL

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<i>Network Guru:</i>	Modify Personal Info
<i>Modify Admin Attributes</i>	MAILBOX
Admin:	John Doe:
Modify User Attributes	Send-As
	Receive-As

TABLE 4 – ORIGINAL AND REVISED 4.0 SECURITY DESCRIPTORS

Note that in this conversion, the italicized right “Modify Admin Attributes” was ignored since that right has no corresponding mapping rule.

Next, the revised 4.0 security descriptor that follows the Active Directory specification is compared with the Active Directory security descriptor (step 750). In so doing, each converted right of the revised security descriptor is compared to the corresponding right in the Active Directory security descriptor (act 760) so that changes to the 4.0 security descriptor that need to be replicated to the Active Directory security descriptor can be detected (act 770). The following TABLE 5 illustrates the revised 4.0 security descriptor and the Active Directory security descriptor side-by-side.

<u>REVISED 4.0 SD</u>	<u>AD SD</u>
STANDARD	STANDARD
John Doe:	John Doe:
	<i>Change Password</i>
Modify Personal Info	Modify Personal Info
Admin:	Admin:

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Modify Personal Info

Modify Personal Info

Support:

Reset Password

MAILBOX

MAILBOX

John Doe:

John Doe:

Send-As

Send-As

Receive-As

Receive-As

Boss:

Receive-As

TABLE 5 – REVISED 4.0 AND ACTIVE DIRECTORY SECURITY DESCRIPTORS

Rights for which there are no mapping rules are italicized in TABLE 5 to emphasize that these rights are ignored when replicating using the embodiment of Figure 7. Also, rights for which there is a mapping rule, but no corresponding right in the opposite security descriptor are highlighted in bold. For example, a right-by-right inspection of the revised 4.0 security descriptor and the Active Directory security descriptor reveals that Boss has the right to receive as John Doe in the Active Directory security descriptor, but not in the 4.0 security descriptor specification. Thus, in act 780 of Figure 7, this right is removed from the Active Directory security descriptor.

There are several noteworthy differences between the 4.0 specification and the Active Directory specification. One difference is that the Active Directory specification has a standard portion and a mailbox portion while the 4.0 specification has no such division. Another difference is the way that the specifications represent rights.

When implementing the method of Figure 7, these differences in the specifications are taken into consideration. Figure 10 illustrates flowchart of how changes to a 4.0 security descriptor are replicated to an Active Directory security descriptor. The method of

1 Figure 10 is performed twice, once for the standard portion of the Active Directory
2 security descriptor, and once for the mailbox portion of the Active Directory.

3 On the 4.0 security descriptor side, the 4.0 security descriptor is converted into a
4 version of the 4.0 security descriptor that follows the Active Directory specification at least
5 so far as the standard portion of the Active Directory specification is concerned (step
6 1010). This is accomplished using the mapping rules and corresponds to step 710 of
7 Figure 7. Next, the standard portion of this revised 4.0 security descriptor is split into
8 rights that are represented as object ACEs and rights that are represented as non-object
9 ACEs (step 1020). On the Active Directory descriptor side, the standard portion of the
10 Active Directory security descriptor is also split into rights that are represented as object
11 ACEs and rights that are represented as non-object ACEs (step 1030).

12 The object ACEs from both the revised 4.0 security descriptor and the Active
13 Directory security descriptor are then compared and detected changes are applied to the
14 object ACEs from the standard portion of the Active Directory security descriptor using
15 the mapping rules (step 1040). This corresponds to step 750 and act 780 of Figure 7.
16 Also, the non-object ACEs from both the revised 4.0 security descriptor and the Active
17 Directory security descriptor are then compared and detected changes are applied to the
18 non-object ACEs from the standard portion of the Active Directory security descriptor
19 using the mapping rules (step 1050). The non-object ACEs and the object ACEs from the
20 standard portion of the Active Directory security descriptor are then merged to form a new
21 standard portion of the Active Directory security descriptor (step 1060). This method is
22 repeated for the mailbox portion of the Active Directory security descriptor.

23 Figure 11 illustrates a flowchart of how changes to an Active Directory security
24 descriptor are replicated to a 4.0 security descriptor. On the Active Directory specification

1 side, the Active Directory security descriptor is mapped to a version of the Active
2 Directory security descriptor that follows the 4.0 specification (step 1110). This
3 corresponds to step 710 of Figure 7. On the 4.0 specification side, any high bit in the 4.0
4 security descriptor is stripped unless the high bit does not have a corresponding mapping
5 rule (step 1120). Next, the stripped access mask from step 1120 is merged (step 1130)
6 with the converted access mask from step 1110 to form a new 4.0 security descriptor that is
7 consistent with the Active Directory security descriptor at least so far as the mapping rules
8 are concerned. In this case, the steps 750 and 780 of Figure 7 are accomplished in
9 combination by the combination of steps 1120 and 1130.

10 The principles of the present invention replicate security descriptors that follow
11 different security descriptor specifications, thus allowing for different security descriptor
12 specifications to describe the same object. This replication occurs through a non-
13 degenerative mapping conversions between the first and second security specifications.
14 Thus, data is not lost from security descriptors that follow either specification even when
15 replicating from one specification to the other and back.

16 The present invention may be embodied in other specific forms without departing
17 from its spirit or essential characteristics. The described embodiments are to be considered
18 in all respects only as illustrative and not restrictive. The scope of the invention is,
19 therefore, indicated by the appended claims rather than by the foregoing description. All
20 changes which come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the claims are to be
21 embraced within their scope.

22 What is claimed and desired to be secured by United States Letters Patent is:
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